I. Issue Definition
The Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) was officially established in July 1984 with the proclamation of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act. This landmark legislation created a distinct civilian intelligence agency, replacing the former Security Service which had operated as a branch of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP).
The creation of CSIS was a significant step towards enhancing oversight and accountability within Canada’s security intelligence apparatus. At the time, Canada was among the pioneering Western democracies to codify the mandate of its security intelligence service in explicit statutory law. The CSIS Act outlined the agency’s operational scope, mandated judicial warrants for intrusive investigative techniques, and established review bodies to ensure adherence to its legal framework.
II. Background and Analysis
A. The Genesis and Development of the Security Intelligence Service
The groundwork for the CSIS Act was laid by the 1981 report of the Commission of Inquiry Concerning Certain Activities of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, widely known as the “McDonald Commission.” This commission was formed in 1977 in response to public revelations of unlawful and questionable practices by the RCMP Security Service. Its mandate was to investigate and report on activities “not authorized or provided for by law,” recommend remedial actions, and advise on necessary reforms to national security policies and procedures.
The Security Service that the McDonald Commission examined had evolved organically within the RCMP, lacking a specific statutory foundation. Its authority was derived from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act, which granted the Governor in Council the power to assign functions to the Force. It was not until 1975 that the Security Service received a formal mandate, even then, it was merely a broadly worded cabinet directive.
The roots of security intelligence within federal policing can be traced back to 1864, when Sir John A. Macdonald assigned duties to the nascent Dominion Police Force. These responsibilities encompassed safeguarding government buildings and gathering intelligence on threats to Canadian security, such as the Fenian Brotherhood. The North West Mounted Police later assumed similar roles in the western territories.
The security intelligence function of the federal police expanded gradually from Confederation through World War I, driven by concerns about labor unrest, anarchism, and the rise of communism. This expansion intensified during the interwar period. However, it was only after World War II that the security function was separated from the RCMP’s Criminal Investigation Branch, which had been established in 1920.
The 1946 Gouzenko Affair, the defection of a Soviet cipher clerk in Ottawa, highlighted the urgent need for enhanced security within government institutions and specialized counter-espionage and counter-intelligence capabilities to address the escalating activities of the Eastern Bloc. In response, the Special Branch was created in 1946. Reporting directly to the RCMP Commissioner, this branch was tasked with gathering intelligence on espionage and subversion, and ensuring the loyalty and trustworthiness of federal employees. By 1956, the Special Branch had been elevated to a directorate within the RCMP, overseen by an Assistant Commissioner. In 1970, it was renamed the Security Service and placed under the control of a civilian Director General (equivalent to a deputy commissioner), who reported to both the Commissioner and the Solicitor General. (The RCMP had become the responsibility of the Solicitor General in 1966, when that position was elevated to full ministerial status; previously, the force reported to the Minister of Justice.)
The 1970 reorganization was primarily a consequence of the 1969 Report of the Royal Commission on Security, known as the “Mackenzie Commission.” Formed in 1966 after a publicized security breach in a federal institution, the Mackenzie Commission was mandated to investigate government security procedures and broadly examine Canada’s national security framework. Its key recommendation was the creation of a separate civilian security agency. The commission argued that security intelligence work was fundamentally incompatible with the law enforcement mandate of the RCMP. It found that the Special Branch lacked the necessary analytical sophistication and expertise, being staffed exclusively by RCMP officers, to effectively fulfill the security intelligence role. The Mackenzie Commission also advocated for legislation governing the security agency’s use of intrusive investigative techniques and for an improved security screening system with an appeal process.
While rejecting the complete “civilianization” of the Special Branch at that time, the government committed to making the security intelligence function “increasingly separate in structure and civilian in nature” within the RCMP. This commitment led to the creation of the Security Service and the appointment of a civilian Director General. The government also pledged to recruit more civilians into the Security Service to broaden its expertise and enhance its flexibility. In 1974, a partial response to the Mackenzie Commission’s recommendations came with the passage of s. 16 of the Official Secrets Act. This section empowered the Solicitor General to authorize the interception or seizure of communications if satisfied that the conduct under investigation fell within a broad definition of activities detrimental to national security, including espionage, sabotage, foreign intelligence activities, and political violence.
B. Abuses by the Security Service
By the early 1970s, the Security Service was in a precarious position. Its personnel, largely unchanged, retained the extensive powers of peace officers. Composed almost entirely of RCMP officers promoted from within, the Service resisted the integration of civilian personnel. By the end of the decade, no civilian held an officer-equivalent position in planning or operations within the Security Service.
Despite the continuity in personnel, the Security Service gained increasing autonomy in policy, budget, and operations post-1970. Service employees enjoyed both police powers and significant independence from the RCMP command structure. This autonomy was reinforced by the government’s “non-interference” policy towards the RCMP, which aimed to prevent political involvement in police control and operational direction. While a sound principle for public policing with checks and balances, it proved problematic for a clandestine security intelligence agency requiring political oversight. The RCMP’s dual role as both a police force and a security agency masked abuses within the latter.
The precarious balance of the Security Service was disrupted by external events. The 1970 October Crisis, a period of political kidnappings and terrorism in Quebec, exposed the government’s lack of adequate intelligence on the scope and nature of Quebec separatism. The government tasked the RCMP with adopting a “proactive” strategy to gather advance intelligence on nationalist organizations and, if possible, prevent or “counter” disruptive actions. The Security Service responded with an extensive campaign of intelligence-gathering, infiltration, harassment, and disruption targeting a wide spectrum of nationalist sentiment in Quebec. This campaign involved numerous illegal acts. Notable examples included: the arson of a barn to disrupt a meeting of militant nationalists and American radicals; a break-in at a Montreal left-wing news agency, resulting in the theft and destruction of files; and the break-in and theft of Parti Québécois membership lists. The McDonald Commission found that these operations were not authorized by the government but were initiated within the Security Service in response to the directive to gather more information on separatism. Beyond their illegality, these operations demonstrated a failure to distinguish between genuine threats and legitimate dissent and yielded little valuable intelligence or impact on targeted organizations.
While the most publicized abuses occurred in Quebec, illegal or improper activities were not confined to that province. Across Canada, the Security Service engaged in a range of questionable actions, particularly targeting left-wing and radical groups, employing “dirty tricks” against perceived national security threats. A 1975 cabinet directive, issued at the RCMP’s request, formalized the Security Service’s mandate, broadly permitting it to “discern, monitor, investigate, deter, prevent and counter” individuals engaged in subversive or other activities deemed detrimental to national security.
The abuses extended beyond the 1970s and “countering” nationalist or radical threats. The McDonald Commission revealed long-standing practices of surreptitious entry, mail opening, and unauthorized access to confidential government information, across various national security domains, from espionage and counter-intelligence to subversion. The Commission concluded that while some of these investigative powers were necessary, they often lacked legal authorization. Furthermore, this “institutionalized” wrongdoing was not exclusive to the Security Service; the RCMP’s Criminal Investigation Branch also had a history of similar abuses.
C. The McDonald Commission’s Recommendations
The McDonald Commission conducted a comprehensive four-year review of the Security Service, documenting numerous illegalities and improprieties. It found that political leaders were largely unaware of the Service’s misconduct, highlighting a critical failure in control and accountability mechanisms. The exposure of these issues was not due to internal review or audit, but rather to chance disclosures by disgruntled former Service members and media and opposition pressure.
The McDonald Commission’s report was highly critical of the Security Service. While acknowledging the Service’s competence in addressing core security needs, particularly espionage and foreign intelligence activities, the Commission identified significant shortcomings in sophistication and analytical capabilities. Specifically, it noted an inability to differentiate between subversion and legitimate dissent, coupled with an anti-left-wing bias. The Service also lacked a clear mandate, effective political control, and adequate oversight of its operations.
The Commission’s primary recommendation was the establishment of a fully separate civilian security agency, echoing the Mackenzie Commission’s rationale. It emphasized the need for a shift towards information gathering and analysis, rather than deterrence or counteraction, necessitating new personnel and organizational structures. The new agency was to be politically accountable and subject to rigorous review, reforms deemed incompatible with the RCMP framework. The report concluded that law enforcement and security intelligence work were fundamentally incompatible.
The proposed civilian agency would operate under a statutory mandate, defining the specific threats to Canadian security it was authorized to investigate. This definition comprised four elements: espionage and sabotage; foreign interference; political violence and terrorism; and revolutionary subversion – activities aimed at destroying the democratic system. Crucially, the report recommended explicitly prohibiting the agency from investigating lawful advocacy, protest, or dissent, and stipulated that it would not possess law enforcement powers.
Recognizing the need for effective intelligence gathering, the Commission acknowledged that the new agency would require access to intrusive investigative techniques, such as electronic surveillance, surreptitious entry, mail opening, and access to confidential information. However, these methods were to be subject to judicial warrants, issued only when a court was satisfied that the investigation fell within the agency’s mandate and, importantly, were not to be authorized for investigating “subversive” threats.
The proposed agency was to be managed by a Director General, accountable to the Solicitor General. The Solicitor General was envisioned to play a significant supervisory role, issuing operational directives and authorizing warrant applications. To ensure legal compliance, the Commission proposed robust external review mechanisms. The first layer of review was the Advisory Committee on Security and Intelligence, a three-member appointed body tasked with continuous operational review to ensure legality and propriety. It would also investigate complaints and report to the Minister and Parliament. The second crucial element of review was a special joint parliamentary committee, appointed for the duration of each Parliament, serving as the ultimate oversight body. Working in conjunction with the advisory committee, this parliamentary committee would be responsible for ensuring the agency operated within its mandate on behalf of Parliament.
D. The Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act
Following the release of the McDonald Commission Report in August 1981, the government promptly signaled its acceptance of the core recommendation: the creation of a civilian security service. A special transitional group within the Solicitor General’s ministry was tasked with translating the Commission’s recommendations into legislation.
In May 1983, Bill C-157 was introduced in the House of Commons during the first session of the 32nd Parliament. This bill proposed the establishment of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), based on the McDonald Commission’s framework but with significant modifications and additions. The bill immediately faced strong criticism, accused of being an assault on civil liberties, granting excessively broad powers to the proposed service, shielding the government from accountability, and failing to establish a precise mandate or effective review system. Public opposition was so intense that the government opted against proceeding to second reading and instead referred the bill’s subject matter to a special Senate committee. This committee conducted public hearings throughout the summer of 1983, gathering a wide range of public opinions on the bill. In its November 1983 report, the Senate committee recommended over 40 amendments to achieve “a more appropriate balance between collective and individual security.”
Following the Senate committee’s report, Bill C-157 was allowed to lapse. In the second session of the 32nd Parliament, a new Bill, C-9, was introduced, incorporating virtually all of the Senate committee’s recommendations. Bill C-9 received first reading in January 1984, was referred to the House of Commons Justice Committee in March, passed third reading in June, and was proclaimed in force in July and August 1984. The enacted legislation closely mirrored the bill introduced in January.
The cornerstone of the CSIS Act is the definition of “threats to the security of Canada” in section 2, which delineates the operational boundaries of CSIS. The four threat categories recommended by the McDonald Commission were retained:
- espionage or sabotage against Canada or detrimental to Canadian interests, and activities supporting such acts;
- foreign-influenced activities within or relating to Canada that are detrimental to Canadian interests, are clandestine or deceptive, or involve threats to individuals;
- activities within or relating to Canada directed towards or supporting the threat or use of serious violence against persons or property for political objectives within Canada or a foreign state; and
- activities directed towards undermining by covert unlawful acts, or intended to lead to the violent overthrow of the constitutionally established system of government in Canada.
The definition explicitly excludes lawful advocacy, protest, or dissent from the scope of security threats.
Section 12 of the Act outlines CSIS’s core function: to investigate, collect, analyze, and retain information and intelligence on security threats. Bill C-157 had included a provision explicitly allowing CSIS to “remain informed” about the general economic, social, and political climate through public sources. While initially present in Bill C-9, this provision was later deemed redundant and removed. Section 13 mandates CSIS to provide security assessments for individuals seeking government employment. Finally, section 16 tasks CSIS with assisting in the collection of “foreign intelligence,” defined as intelligence derived from the investigation or surveillance of non-Canadian citizens or permanent residents, pertaining to defense or international affairs. Responding to Senate committee recommendations, this function was more narrowly focused on non-Canadians and requires a written request from the Minister of National Defence or the Minister of Foreign Affairs, with the Solicitor General’s consent.
Part II of the CSIS Act (sections 21-28) empowers the Federal Court to issue warrants authorizing CSIS to employ a full range of investigative techniques, excluding access to confidential census data held by Statistics Canada, in carrying out its functions under sections 12 and 16. The warrant process incorporates numerous safeguards and informational requirements added based on Senate Committee recommendations, mirroring Criminal Code warrant requirements for electronic surveillance. Warrants are limited to a one-year duration, except for those related to paragraph (d) threats (subversion), which are limited to 60 days. This shorter duration, introduced in the House Justice Committee, partially acknowledged the McDonald Commission’s recommendation against using intrusive techniques for subversion investigations. All warrants are renewable upon re-application to the court.
The Act vests management and control of CSIS in a Director, appointed by the Governor in Council. The Solicitor General is assigned a significant supervisory role. Bill C-157 initially adopted an Australian model granting the Director final authority on targeting and information release, excluding any operational role for the Minister. This approach, intended to prevent partisan misuse of CSIS, drew substantial public criticism for diminishing the Minister’s direct political accountability. The Senate Committee strongly criticized these provisions. The final Act mandates Ministerial approval for all warrant applications and grants the Minister an override authority. Another controversial provision in Bill C-157, offering agency employees a defense for “reasonably necessary” acts in the course of duty, was replaced in the Act by section 20, which extends peace officer legal protections to CSIS employees.
Two key control and review mechanisms from Bill C-157 were retained in the Act: the office of Inspector General (section 30) and the Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC, section 34). The Inspector General, appointed by the Governor in Council, is responsible for monitoring CSIS operations and reporting to the Deputy Solicitor General and SIRC on their legality and propriety. SIRC, composed of up to five Privy Councillors appointed by the Governor in Council after consultation with opposition leaders, conducts comprehensive reviews of CSIS operations and reports to the Minister and Parliament. SIRC also has investigative duties, addressing complaints about CSIS activities and acting as an appeal board for security assessments and security-influenced decisions under the Citizenship and Immigration Acts.
A final aspect of the legislation, not addressed by the McDonald Commission, is the former Part IV of the Act (sections 56-61), now known as the Security Offences Act. This Act governs police and prosecutorial authority for security-related offenses. It designates the RCMP with “primary responsibility” for investigating such offenses, allowing them to collaborate with other police forces. The Security Offences Act also empowers the federal Attorney General to prosecute security offenses and to intervene in and assume control of provincial prosecutions of such offenses. Despite provincial criticism regarding jurisdictional infringement, this Act remained largely unchanged throughout the legislative process.
E. The Controversial Issues
The legislation that emerged from Parliament was far from a consensus product. Committee proceedings and report stages for Bill C-9 were highly contentious. Opposition parties strongly opposed fundamental aspects, reflecting significant public concern.
A central point of contention was the shift of the security function from the RCMP to a civilian service. Several provincial attorneys general, the Progressive Conservative party, some civil liberties groups, and eventually the New Democratic Party opposed this change. Their primary argument was that, with a clear mandate and effective review, the RCMP, with its discipline, tradition, established networks, and perceived resilience to foreign infiltration, was better suited for the security function. Others argued that the legislation’s flaws were so significant that maintaining the status quo was preferable.
The mandate granted to CSIS also faced substantial opposition, concerning both its breadth and the very concept of a security agency dealing with matters like “subversion” or “foreign-influenced activities.” The Canadian Civil Liberties Association, for instance, argued for a smaller agency focused solely on espionage and sabotage from foreign nations, with other threats handled by regular law enforcement under criminal law.
The scope of the threat definition remained controversial. Critics argued it was overly broad, potentially encompassing activities unrelated to genuine security concerns. The government maintained that the definition should be interpreted within the context of provisions protecting lawful dissent and limiting the agency to “strictly necessary” actions, alongside the new monitoring and review system. In this context, they argued the definition was reasonable. The “foreign intelligence” function (section 16) was also contentious, with many questioning the justification for surveilling foreign nationals who posed no security threat but could provide information relevant to defense or international affairs. The warrant system’s reach, granting CSIS access to a wide range of investigative techniques, including surreptitious entry and access to doctor-patient confidences, was another area of concern.
Most other aspects of the Act were less contentious, except for two review-related issues. The first concerned information access for the Inspector General and SIRC. Both bodies were granted access to all CSIS information except cabinet documents (sections 31(2) and 39(3)). These exceptions, initially in Bill C-157, were widely criticized as hindering the review bodies’ ability to fully discharge their functions. The Senate Committee recommended removing these exceptions. In the House Justice Committee, some government members joined the opposition in voting for their removal, but they were ultimately reinstated at the report stage in the House, with the government citing the need for cabinet confidentiality.
The second issue was direct parliamentary oversight of CSIS. While recommended by the McDonald Commission, it was absent from Bill C-157. The Senate committee rejected it as impractical, duplicative of SIRC, and potentially compromising secrecy. However, both opposition parties supported a special parliamentary committee with access to agency information to ensure parliamentary assurance of CSIS operating within its mandate. They expressed skepticism about SIRC providing a complete picture of agency operations and pointed to examples in Germany and the United States where such committees had proven workable and effective. The government remained firm in its opposition and refused to incorporate direct parliamentary oversight.
F. 1984 to Present
On August 17, 1987, the Federal Court of Appeal, in a 2-1 decision, upheld the warrant-granting provision of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act (s.21) as constitutional under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The case involved an individual (Atwal) accused in an attack on a visiting Punjabi Cabinet Minister, who sought access to the affidavit supporting a warrant application in Federal Court. Justice Heald initially upheld s.21 and denied access. On appeal, Justices Mahoney and MacGuigan affirmed s.21’s constitutionality but reversed Justice Heald’s decision, granting access to the affidavit with CSIS agent and informant names redacted.
On September 11, 1987, T.D. Finn resigned as Director of CSIS and was succeeded by J. Reid Morden, former Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet for Foreign and Defence Policy. Mr. Finn’s resignation followed the revelation in Federal Court that warrant affidavits in the Atwal case contained inaccuracies and irregularities.
On November 30, 1987, the Solicitor General released the report of an independent advisory team chaired by Gordon Osbaldeston and announced acceptance and implementation of its recommendations. The Osbaldeston Report was critical of CSIS, recommending changes across all facets of the service, particularly addressing excessive internal compartmentalization, insufficient use of open sources, underdeveloped analytical capacity, unclear policy directives on targeting, human source management, intrusive investigative techniques, and inadequate training programs. The Report recommended reopening the CSIS staff college and eliminating the Counter Subversion Branch.
On March 29, 1988, the Solicitor General released SIRC’s report on CSIS’s use of investigative powers concerning the labor movement. SIRC concluded that neither CSIS nor its human source, Marc André Boivin, had targeted union members or unions for legitimate labor activities. However, the report criticized CSIS for retaining Mr. Boivin’s services beyond their usefulness, lacking policies for determining the necessity of human sources, and for inappropriately maintaining and utilizing RCMP Security Service files. SIRC acknowledged the Solicitor General and CSIS Director’s prompt action to address these issues.
In the Thomson case, an individual was denied a position with the Department of Agriculture due to an unfavorable CSIS security assessment. He appealed to SIRC, which recommended a positive security clearance. The Deputy Minister of Agriculture rejected this recommendation. On March 7, 1988, the Federal Court of Appeal ruled that SIRC recommendations were binding on the government due to the CSIS Act‘s statutory structure. However, it also stated that the Federal Court of Appeal lacked jurisdiction to make a binding ruling in this “administrative” matter. On June 17, 1988, Justice Dubé of the Federal Court, Trial Division, respectfully disagreed with the Federal Court of Appeal’s obiter opinion and ruled that SIRC recommendations in security clearance cases were not binding. This ruling was appealed. On May 17, 1990, a different Federal Court of Appeal panel overturned Justice Dubé’s decision, affirming the binding nature of SIRC recommendations. The Supreme Court of Canada granted leave to appeal in Thomson. On February 13, 1992, the Supreme Court ruled that SIRC recommendations in security clearance cases were not binding on the government. Justice Joyal followed this Supreme Court ruling in the Kwan Lihuen case on October 4, 1990, involving the revocation of a security clearance for a CSIS Chinese language translator.
On January 26, 1989, the Federal Court of Appeal rendered its decision in the Russell case. Russell sought to know if CSIS had investigated him. SIRC informed Russell that CSIS had acted properly and legally. In a bench decision, Justice Pratte ruled that SIRC’s letter to Russell was a “report of findings,” not a “decision,” and therefore not subject to judicial review.
On March 9, 1989, Stephen Ratkai, who pleaded guilty to espionage for the Soviet Union under the Official Secrets Act, was sentenced to nine years imprisonment.
On March 23, 1989, Marc André Boivin initiated legal action against CSIS, SIRC, and the Solicitor General, seeking $500,000 in damages. He sued CSIS for revealing his activities to the Sûreté du Québec and SIRC for publicly reporting on his activities without adequate opportunity for him to present his perspective.
On May 15, 1989, the Canadian Civil Liberties Association launched litigation in Ontario Court (General Division) challenging the CSIS Act‘s constitutionality under the Charter of Rights. Justice Potts of the Ontario Court (General Division) ruled on August 16, 1990, that the CCLA had standing to pursue the litigation. In a judgment released on March 25, 1992, Justice Potts ruled that the CSIS Act did not violate the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed the CCLA’s appeal in a 2-1 decision on July 9, 1998. The Supreme Court of Canada refused leave to appeal.
In the Chiarelli case, the Federal Court of Appeal ruled on February 23, 1990, that the CSIS Act provision allowing SIRC to exclude complainants and counsel from parts of its hearings violated the Charter of Rights. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal. On March 26, 1992, the Supreme Court reversed the Federal Court of Appeal, ruling that the provision was constitutional.
On August 14, 1990, SIRC issued a report concerning the Canadian Armed Forces and former member M.D. Douglas. SIRC criticized the Forces’ investigation into Ms. Douglas’s sexual orientation and the subsequent withdrawal of her security clearance. Concluding she was not a security risk, SIRC recommended clearance restoration and reinstatement. This decision was appealed to the Federal Court of Appeal.
III. Parliamentary Action
Parliamentary oversight of CSIS operations is mandated by section 53 of the CSIS Act, requiring the Solicitor General to table SIRC’s annual report in Parliament. House of Commons Standing Orders automatically refer any report tabled in Parliament to a relevant committee, in this case, the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights.
Sections 56 of the CSIS Act and 7 of the Security Offences Act, recommended by the Senate Committee, provided for a parliamentary review of the Acts’ operation within five years of their enactment. This committee was to report with recommended changes. The House of Commons established a Special Committee on June 27, 1989, to review these Acts, reporting its findings and 117 recommendations on September 24, 1990, in a report titled In Flux but not in Crisis.
The Committee’s report generally concluded that Canada’s security and intelligence system was sound and reforms should build upon existing institutions. Recommendations addressed mandate definitions, labor relations, human resources, review roles of the Inspector General and SIRC, complaint roles of SIRC and the RCMP Public Complaints Commission, and establishing a parliamentary sub-committee for security and intelligence community monitoring. The Committee requested a government response within 150 days.
The government tabled its response, On Course: National Security for the 1990s, on February 25, 1991. It asserted that legislative changes to the CSIS Act and Security Offences Act were unnecessary and expressed unwillingness to consider structural changes to the national security model at that time. However, the government committed to providing Parliament with an annual statement of national security issues, starting in 1992, alongside a public Annual Report by the CSIS Director discussing the “threat environment.” The government agreed to another parliamentary review of the CSIS Act and Security Offences Act to commence in 1998.
On February 26, 1991, the House of Commons debated an Opposition motion to concur with the In Flux but not in Crisis report, adjourning without a vote.
Following a recommendation in In Flux but not in Crisis, the House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Solicitor General established a permanent Sub-Committee on National Security on June 13, 1991, holding its first meeting on June 18, 1991.
In fulfillment of a commitment in On Course: National Security for the 1990s, the Solicitor General delivered his first Annual Statement on National Security and tabled the CSIS Director’s first Public Report on March 19, 1992.
On April 11, 1994, the Solicitor General delivered his Annual Statement and tabled the CSIS Director’s Public Report 1993. On April 13, 1994, during a House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs appearance, the Solicitor General provided a three-figure breakdown of CSIS’s budget for the first time. The 1994-95 Main Estimates allocated $206,834,000 to CSIS, including personnel, construction/land acquisition, and other subsidies/payments.
The House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs re-established its Sub-Committee on National Security on May 3, 1994.
On August 14, 1994, public allegations emerged regarding a CSIS human source, Grant Bristow, and his prominent role in the Heritage Front, a far-right organization. SIRC initiated an investigation, and on August 29, 1994, the House of Commons Sub-Committee on National Security announced its own investigation.
SIRC’s report on CSIS involvement with the Heritage Front was released on December 15, 1994. It confirmed CSIS had a human source within the Heritage Front who was properly targeted and provided valuable intelligence. SIRC concluded the source played a support, not leadership, role in the Heritage Front and that many public allegations were exaggerated or untrue, though it expressed concern about the source’s “borderline” activities. SIRC recommended improved policy guidance for human source placement and control.
On December 16, 1994, SIRC members appeared before the House of Commons Sub-Committee on National Security to answer questions about the Heritage Front report.
On March 28, 1995, the Solicitor General delivered his Annual Statement and tabled the CSIS Director’s Public Report 1994. This report included a Program Outlook projecting budget and personnel reductions through the 1997-98 fiscal year.
The House of Commons Sub-Committee on National Security tabled its report on document and personnel security on October 4, 1995, recommending strengthened Government Security Policy extended to Ministers’ offices. The government accepted these recommendations on February 28, 1996.
On June 19, 1996, the House of Commons Sub-Committee on National Security tabled its Report on the “Heritage Front Affair,” including majority, joint dissenting, and individual dissenting opinions.
On August 1, 1996, Justice Heald of the Federal Court ruled in Zundel that there was reasonable apprehension of bias in SIRC’s consideration of a citizenship case involving an individual SIRC had criticized in its Heritage Front report. The government appealed. Bill C-84, amending the Citizenship Act and Immigration Act to provide an alternative process in similar situations, was passed on April 25, 1997. The Federal Court of Appeal reversed Justice Heald’s Zundel decision on November 27, 1997. The Supreme Court of Canada denied leave to appeal on April 30, 1998.
IV. Chronology
1946 – RCMP’s security functions expanded; personnel separated from Criminal Investigations Branch into the Special Branch.
1956 – Special Branch elevated to Directorate level within RCMP, under an Assistant Commissioner.
1969 – Royal Commission on Security recommended a civilian security agency. Government declined but promised to separate Special Branch and increase civilian staff.
1970 – Special Branch became the Security Service, led by civilian Director General, John Starnes.
October 1970 – October Crisis: James Cross kidnapping; Pierre Laporte kidnapping and murder. War Measures Act proclaimed.
1971-74 – Security Service undertook illegal acts, particularly in Quebec, to neutralize radical and separatist groups.
March 27, 1975 – Federal cabinet issued a directive governing Security Service operations (remained secret until 1978).
March 30, 1976 – Cpl. R. Samson revealed participation in illegal break-in operation (Operation Bricole) in 1972.
June 1977 – Former Security Service staff-sergeant Donald McCleery disclosed details of other illegal operations, including Operation Ham (PQ membership list theft).
July 6, 1977 – Solicitor General Fox appointed Justice D.C. McDonald to head inquiry commission into RCMP wrongdoing.
June 1981 – Quebec government laid charges against 17 current/former RCMP members after its own inquiry.
August 25, 1981 – McDonald Commission final report made public.
May 18, 1983 – Bill C-157 (CSIS Act) first reading in House of Commons.
June 29, 1983 – Bill C-157 referred to Senate Special Committee, which recommended substantial amendments.
January 18, 1984 – Bill C-9 (revised CSIS Act) first reading in House of Commons, incorporating Senate Committee changes.
June 21, 1984 – Bill C-9 passed third reading in House and Senate.
July 16, 1984 – Most of CSIS Act proclaimed in force (excluding Part II – warrants).
August 31, 1984 – Part II of CSIS Act (warrants) proclaimed in force.
November 29, 1984 – First SIRC members appointed, chaired by Ronald Atkey.
February 15, 1985 – Richard Gosse appointed first Inspector General under CSIS Act.
July 22, 1987 – Solicitor General announced independent advisory team to report on SIRC recommendations re: counter-subversion and civilianization.
July 30, 1987 – Senate Special Committee on Terrorism and Public Safety released its Report.
September 11, 1987 – T.D. Finn resigned as CSIS Director; J. Reid Morden appointed.
November 30, 1987 – Solicitor General released and accepted independent advisory team’s report.
March 29, 1988 – SIRC issued Special Report on CSIS activities related to the labour movement and Marc André Boivin.
June 27, 1989 – House of Commons established Special Committee for five-year review of CSIS Act and Security Offences Act.
June 28, 1989 – Senate Special Committee on Terrorism and Public Safety tabled its second and final report.
September 24, 1990 – House of Commons Special Committee tabled In Flux but not in Crisis report.
February 25, 1991 – Government tabled On Course: National Security for the 1990s, response to House Committee report.
February 26, 1991 – House of Commons debated concurrence motion on CSIS Act review report.
June 13, 1991 – House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Solicitor General established Sub-Committee on National Security.
June 18, 1991 – Sub-Committee on National Security first meeting.
May 3, 1994 – House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs re-established Sub-Committee on National Security.
August 14-29, 1994 – Public allegations about CSIS human source Grant Bristow and Heritage Front; SIRC and House Sub-Committee investigations launched.
August 29, 1994 – House of Commons Sub-Committee announced Heritage Front-CSIS link investigation.
December 15, 1994 – SIRC Report on CSIS and Heritage Front released.
December 16, 1994 – SIRC members appeared before House Sub-Committee on Heritage Front report.
October 4, 1995 – House Sub-Committee tabled Document and Personnel Security Report.
June 19, 1996 – House Sub-Committee tabled Report on the Heritage Front Affair.
August 1, 1996 – Federal Court judgment in Zundel.
April 25, 1997 – Bill C-84 received Royal Assent (Citizenship/Immigration Act amendments).
October 3, 1997 – Federal Court judgment critical of CSIS “visitors clauses” in warrants.
November 27, 1997 – Federal Court of Appeal reversed Zundel decision. Supreme Court of Canada denied leave to appeal.
March 26, 1998 – Senate established Special Committee on Security and Intelligence.
July 9, 1998 – Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed Canadian Civil Liberties Association case appeal. Supreme Court of Canada denied leave to appeal.
January 1999 – Senate Special Committee on Security and Intelligence tabled its report.
November 1999 – Media reports of CSIS document theft and mishandling.
December 16, 1999 – Solicitor General Annual Statement on National Security and response to Senate Special Committee report.
V. Selected References
Atkey, Ronald G., “Reconciling Freedom of Expression and National Security.” (1991) 41 University of Toronto Law Journal 38-59.
Canada, House of Commons, Special Committee on the Review of the CSIS Act and the Security Offenders Act. Report – In Flux but Not in Crisis. Supply and Services Canada, Ottawa, 1990.
Canada, House of Commons, Standing Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs, Sub-Committee on National Security. Document and Personnel Security. Tenth Report of theStanding Committee. Tabled on 4 October 1996.
Canada, House of Commons, Standing Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs, Sub-Committee on National Security. The Heritage Front Affair: Our View. First Report of the Standing Committee. Tabled on 19 June 1996.
Canada. Report of the Royal Commission on Security. Queens Printer, Ottawa, 1969.
Canada, Senate Special Committee. Delicate Balance: A Security Intelligence Service in a Democratic Society. Supply and Services Canada, Ottawa, November 1983.
Canada, Senate Special Committee on Terrorism and the Public Safety. Report. Supply and Services Canada, Ottawa, 1987.
Canada, Senate Special Committee on Terrorism and the Public Safety. Second and Final Report. Supply and Services Canada, Ottawa, 1989.
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This revised article provides a comprehensive overview of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, its historical context, legal framework, and operational evolution, optimized for English-speaking audiences interested in national security and intelligence matters.
