The Indo-Pacific region stands as a critical arena in contemporary geopolitics, demanding meticulous strategic oversight and resource allocation. The U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) plays a pivotal role in this theater, tasked with safeguarding U.S. interests and promoting regional stability. This analysis delves into USINDOPACOM’s strategic intent, modernization efforts, and key partnerships, providing an overview relevant to the interests and responsibilities of the House Armed Services Committee. Understanding USINDOPACOM’s posture and requirements is essential for informed congressional oversight and budgetary decisions that shape U.S. defense policy in this vital region.
DPRK: A Persistent Threat Demanding Vigilance
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) remains a paramount concern in the Indo-Pacific. For Pyongyang, regime security is the non-negotiable priority, underpinned by its strategic weapons programs and a substantial conventional military. These assets are perceived as critical deterrents against external aggression and invasion. However, they simultaneously project a tangible threat to U.S. and Republic of Korea (ROK) forces stationed on the Korean Peninsula, as well as to Japan and broader Indo-Pacific territories. The DPRK’s persistent investment in ballistic missiles, nuclear technologies, and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) directly contravenes UN Security Council resolutions. This trajectory aligns with the regime’s long-held ambition of achieving credible strategic deterrence, a point underscored by Kim Jong Un’s December 2022 pronouncement advocating for an exponential expansion of the nation’s nuclear arsenal, coupled with the mass production of tactical nuclear weapons. Reinforcing this stance, September 2022 witnessed the DPRK codifying its self-declared status as a nuclear power through law, outlining conditions for nuclear weapon utilization and unequivocally rejecting denuclearization.
This context is crucial for the House Armed Services Committee, as it necessitates continuous assessment of the DPRK threat and the adequacy of U.S. defense posture to counter it. Congressional oversight of military spending and strategic planning must account for the evolving challenges presented by Pyongyang’s military advancements.
Military Modernization: Balancing WMD Focus with Conventional Needs
USINDOPACOM’s area of responsibility necessitates a multifaceted approach to military modernization, addressing both immediate and long-term threats. The DPRK, for instance, is demonstrably prioritizing upgrades to its nuclear and WMD programs, alongside enhancements to its conventional military capabilities. Notably, Pyongyang’s modernization initiatives are heavily weighted towards WMD forces, evidenced by an unprecedented surge in missile testing throughout 2022. The DPRK is actively expanding its missile stockpile and rigorously testing new, more sophisticated ballistic and cruise missile systems. These systems are designed for launch from diverse platforms, including submarine-based and rail-launched configurations, enhancing their survivability and operational flexibility. In 2022, the regime conducted a test flight of the Hwasong-17 ICBM, asserting its capability to strike the entire continental United States with nuclear weapons. Parallelly, the DPRK is engaged in testing a series of increasingly capable short-range missiles, which Pyongyang claims are designed to deliver tactical nuclear warheads. Intelligence assessments suggest Kim Jong Un appears poised to conduct the first nuclear test since 2017, further escalating regional tensions.
While WMD development receives significant attention, the modernization of the DPRK’s conventional forces proceeds at a comparatively subdued pace. The naval modernization program is notably focused on submarine-launched ballistic missile technology, aiming to enhance its second-strike capability. Limited upgrades are being implemented for air defense systems, and the pursuit of unmanned aerial vehicles for military applications is underway. Modest enhancements to ground forces include new tanks and artillery pieces, observed in parades since 2020, but these appear secondary to WMD advancements.
Furthermore, the DPRK continues to leverage aggressive cyber programs as a low-risk, cost-effective tool for influencing and intimidating adversaries. These cyber operations also serve as a means to steal intellectual property and generate revenue, notably through the theft of crypto assets, which in turn helps finance weapons research and development.
For the House Armed Services Committee, understanding this dual-track modernization approach is crucial. Congressional oversight must ensure that U.S. defense investments effectively address the spectrum of threats posed by the DPRK, encompassing both WMD and evolving conventional capabilities, including cyber warfare.
Destabilizing Actions: Missile Proliferation and Nuclear Ambitions
The DPRK’s actions in 2022 were particularly destabilizing, marked by an unprecedented surge in missile launches and an intensification of its nuclear program. Over 70 ballistic and cruise missile launches were conducted, more than tripling the figures from any preceding year. This included the launch of an Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) that overflew Japan, a provocative act that heightened regional anxieties. 2022 also marked the DPRK’s first Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) launch since 2017, signaling advancements in its long-range strike capabilities. The Hwasong-17 ICBM launch, conducted at a deliberately steep angle, complicated precise capability analysis but underscored the regime’s technological progress. Additionally, the DPRK tested a solid-fuel-powered rocket engine. If successful, this technology would significantly enhance missile mobility and launch readiness compared to current liquid-fuel variants.
Parallel to missile advancements, the DPRK escalated its threatening rhetoric and implemented concrete steps to expand and refine its nuclear capabilities. September 2022 saw Pyongyang formally codify its nuclear use policy, defining its nuclear forces’ mission as both deterrence and wartime utilization. The regime also conducted what it termed “tactical nuclear warhead” training and “ballistic missile launching drills,” directly supporting its stated goals of operationalizing its nuclear weapons program.
In 2022, the DPRK demonstrably reconstituted its nuclear test site at Punggye, indicating potential future nuclear testing. Furthermore, an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report highlighted ongoing operations at the DPRK’s plutonium enrichment facility, signifying continued production of fissile material suitable for nuclear weapons.
These developments are of critical importance to the House Armed Services Committee. The escalating missile launches and nuclear advancements by the DPRK necessitate rigorous congressional oversight of U.S. deterrence strategies, missile defense systems, and diplomatic efforts aimed at denuclearization. Understanding the scope and pace of these destabilizing actions informs the committee’s crucial role in shaping defense policy and resource allocation in response to this evolving threat.
Support to Russia and Sanctions Evasion: Undermining International Norms
The DPRK’s foreign policy actions further compound regional and global security challenges. Pyongyang is leveraging Russia’s war against Ukraine to strengthen bilateral relations with Moscow. Beyond symbolic support, such as voting against the UN General Assembly resolution demanding Russia’s withdrawal and recognizing Russia’s illegal referenda in occupied Ukrainian provinces, the DPRK has reportedly supplied Russia with substantial quantities of ammunition. This support for Russia’s aggression undermines international norms and potentially provides Pyongyang with reciprocal benefits, further complicating geopolitical dynamics.
Simultaneously, the DPRK persists in its sophisticated efforts to evade UN-imposed sanctions. These sanctions are designed to curtail funding for its nuclear, WMD, and ballistic missile programs. A UN Panel of Experts has documented ongoing sanctions evasion by DPRK entities, networks, and vessels, which consistently channel funds to these prohibited programs, directly defying UN Security Council Resolutions.
For the House Armed Services Committee, these actions highlight the complex interplay of international relations and security threats. Congressional oversight must consider the implications of DPRK-Russia cooperation on regional stability and the effectiveness of existing sanctions regimes. Furthermore, understanding the DPRK’s sanctions evasion tactics is crucial for informing legislative efforts to strengthen enforcement mechanisms and prevent further proliferation financing.
Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs): A Persistent Regional Threat
Beyond state-level actors, transnational and ethno-nationalist Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs) continue to pose a persistent threat to safety and stability across the Indo-Pacific region. USINDOPACOM remains actively engaged in defending the United States and its numerous regional allies and partners against this destabilizing threat. Ongoing monitoring efforts are focused on the potential return of foreign fighters from distant conflict zones, and proactive measures are being pursued to disrupt VEOs’ planning and execution of violent attacks.
While not the primary focus of the original document in terms of length, the VEO threat is a relevant consideration for the House Armed Services Committee. Congressional oversight of counter-terrorism efforts in the Indo-Pacific, including intelligence sharing, capacity building with partners, and resource allocation for counter-VEO operations, remains a critical aspect of regional security.
Implementing Seize the Initiative: A Proactive Defense Strategy
USINDOPACOM’s overarching approach to addressing these multifaceted challenges is embodied in the strategy Seize the Initiative. This framework is designed to defend the nation and deter conflict proactively. Should deterrence fail, Seize the Initiative ensures U.S. forces are prepared to fight and win. The strategy is predicated on a distributed force posture that facilitates a campaign of joint and combined operations, leveraging advanced warfighting capabilities and a robust network of allies and partners.
This strategic approach is of direct relevance to the House Armed Services Committee, as it underpins USINDOPACOM’s operational requirements and resource requests. Congressional understanding of Seize the Initiative is essential for informed decision-making regarding defense spending, force structure, and strategic priorities in the Indo-Pacific.
Distributed Force Posture: Enhancing Resilience and Interoperability
A cornerstone of Seize the Initiative is the establishment of a distributed force posture across the Indo-Pacific. Forward-based and rotational joint forces, equipped with lethal capabilities, serve to demonstrate U.S. resolve, bolster the security of allies and partners, and provide the Secretary of Defense and the President with a range of response options when necessary. Definitive Access, Basing, and Overflight (ABO) arrangements are critical enablers, facilitating joint force operations, enhancing interoperability with host nations, and strategically positioning capabilities forward in anticipation of potential crises. A geographically dispersed and distributed force posture west of the International Date Line (IDL) enhances operational flexibility with partners, improves force survivability, reduces risk concentration, and ensures logistical sustainability through a network of stores, munitions, and fuel depots capable of supporting operations in contested environments.
USINDOPACOM is actively pursuing operating locations, both permanent and rotational, distributed across strategic “clusters” throughout the Indo-Pacific. Congressional funding provided in 2023, and further requests in the President’s Budget Request (PBR) for 2024, are crucial for USINDOPACOM to continue planning and implementing efforts to disperse the joint force, enhance interoperability, and build capacity in concert with allies and partners. The classified 1254 Report provides detailed descriptions and prioritizations of specific locations and capabilities at each location, offering a comprehensive roadmap for posture development.
The Guam Cluster: A Critical Forward Operating Base
Guam and the Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI), as the most forward-leaning U.S. territories in the Pacific, are of paramount importance to U.S. regional security. The U.S. Department of Defense, in collaboration with the Government of Japan, has committed over $7 billion for military construction and family housing projects on Guam during FY22-FY28. This significant investment, aligned with the Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI), underscores the commitment to Guam as a major operating base. Home to 170,000 American citizens, Guam’s strategic value in sustaining the joint force cannot be overstated.
Several upcoming key posture projects in Guam and CNMI will require unprecedented levels of military construction. While Guam possesses the third-highest construction workforce per capita nationally, current military construction demands necessitate a workforce more than three times larger than the existing capacity. Anticipated future construction levels are projected to exacerbate persistent labor shortages, which already hinder private sector construction projects. To address this critical workforce gap, the Department of Defense requires relief from H-2B visa restrictions through at least 2029. A longer-term extension beyond the current December 31, 2024 deadline is essential to meet the Department’s requirements and ensure the timely delivery of critical military construction projects.
To effectively execute command and control responsibilities within this crucial region, USINDOPACOM has requested support for Joint Task Force (JTF) Micronesia, forward stationed in Guam. The JTF’s area of responsibility encompasses the Guam cluster, which includes U.S. Territories (Guam, CNMI, Wake Island, and Midway Island) and the Freely Associated States (FAS), comprising the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), Republic of Palau, and the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI).
The House Armed Services Committee plays a vital role in overseeing these posture initiatives. Congressional authorization and appropriations are essential for funding military construction on Guam and CNMI, addressing workforce challenges through visa policy adjustments, and supporting the establishment and operational readiness of JTF Micronesia. Committee oversight ensures that these investments align with strategic objectives and contribute effectively to regional security.
The Japan Cluster: Optimizing Alliance Force Posture
The United States is actively working to strengthen its alliance with Japan and optimize force posture through the forward deployment of more versatile, resilient, and mobile capabilities. An optimized U.S. posture in Japan, alongside enhanced Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) capabilities, particularly in Japan’s Southwest Islands, will significantly bolster deterrence and response capabilities. Recent deployments include MQ-9 remotely piloted aircraft to the Kanoya Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) Base, and the planned establishment of the Composite Watercraft Company at Yokohama North Dock. Collaborative efforts with Japan are also focused on expanding joint/shared use of U.S. and Japanese facilities and increasing the scope and frequency of bilateral exercises and training.
The House Armed Services Committee’s engagement with posture optimization in Japan is crucial. Congressional support for initiatives that enhance alliance interoperability, facilitate joint facility utilization, and promote advanced capability deployments in Japan directly strengthens regional deterrence and aligns with U.S. strategic interests.
The Philippines Cluster: Expanding Defense Cooperation
Significant progress has been made in improving interoperability between U.S. and Philippines forces through the utilization and expansion of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA). EDCA enables the United States to build infrastructure and pre-position equipment at agreed-upon locations within the Philippines. U.S. infrastructure investments under EDCA serve to meet alliance requirements, address short-term Armed Forces Philippines (AFP) capability gaps, support long-term AFP modernization goals, and enhance the Department of Defense’s capacity to respond to Humanitarian Assistance / Disaster Relief (HA/DR) events. In February 2023, the U.S. and Philippine governments announced the addition of four new AFP sites as EDCA agreed locations, bringing the total to nine sites and approximately $82 million in U.S. investments to date.
Congressional oversight of EDCA implementation and expansion is vital. The House Armed Services Committee’s support for infrastructure investments and security cooperation initiatives within the Philippines strengthens a key alliance and enhances U.S. responsiveness to regional security challenges and humanitarian crises.
The Australia Cluster: Deepening All-Domain Cooperation
The United States and Australia have agreed to continue the U.S. rotational presence across air, land, and maritime domains, including U.S. Bomber Task Force rotations. Priority locations within Australia have been identified to support enhanced U.S. force posture, facilitating combined exercises and sustained presence. Assessments are underway regarding the potential use of various Australian locations for logistics, increasing the pre-positioning of munitions and fuel. The 1254 Independent Assessment further identifies significant posture initiatives in Papua New Guinea (PNG), where negotiations on a bilateral Defense Cooperation Agreement are actively progressing.
The House Armed Services Committee’s role extends to overseeing defense cooperation with Australia and posture initiatives in locations like PNG. Congressional support for rotational deployments, logistics enhancements, and the development of defense agreements with key partners like Australia and PNG is essential for maintaining a robust and adaptable U.S. presence in the region.
Campaign of Joint and Combined Operations: Persistent Deterrence
Campaigning, as conceptualized within Seize the Initiative, involves persistent and synchronized joint operations conducted in tandem with allies and partners. These operations, linked across time and space, are designed to build warfighting advantage and effectively deter security challengers. Persistent day-to-day joint operations, aligned with combined exercises, are critical for maintaining a credible deterrent posture. Campaigning normalizes U.S. operational presence throughout the Area of Responsibility (AOR), cultivates interoperable and confident warfighting partners, and provides invaluable opportunities to rehearse warfighting concepts collaboratively. Key highlights from 2022 include ground forces operating in Northern Luzon and Japan’s Southwest Islands, participation in the Rim of the Pacific Exercise (RIMPAC), and a new 14-nation combined exercise initiated by Indonesia, titled Super Garuda Shield.
The House Armed Services Committee’s oversight of joint and combined operations is paramount. Congressional support for exercises like RIMPAC and Super Garuda Shield, as well as funding for persistent operational presence and security cooperation activities, directly contributes to regional stability and strengthens deterrence.
Exercise, Experimentation, and Training: Enhancing Warfighting Proficiency
Joint, all-domain exercises serve as crucial demonstrations of combat credibility, enhancing the joint force’s interoperability with allies and partners and fostering warfighting proficiency. USINDOPACOM’s robust exercise program underscores U.S. commitment to defending the rules-based international order, facilitates capability development, and builds enduring relationships across the region. USINDOPACOM aims to further expand multilateral participation in its exercise program and to conduct training in contested, all-domain environments. Achieving these objectives necessitates continued investment in the Joint Training Exercise and Evaluation Program (JTEEP).
USINDOPACOM is also actively facilitating experimentation with advanced concepts and technologies to accelerate warfighting outcomes. This requires the capacity to conduct high-end, multi-domain experimentation events within a continuous campaign framework. Real-world environments enable rigorous evaluation of promising technologies for potential near-term implementation.
High-end training provides a decisive advantage for U.S. forces and allies and partners. To maximize training effectiveness, USINDOPACOM is linking ranges across all domains via a federation of interconnected live, virtual, and constructive effects, simulation centers, and mobile training support systems, unified under the Pacific Multi-Domain Test and Experimentation Capability (PMTEC). PMTEC provides the combatant commander with the capability to train joint and combined forces forward in theater at the highest levels. This initiative creates the largest coalition range complex globally, equipped with the most advanced capabilities to support operational rehearsals and deliver integrated deterrence.
Congressional support for exercise programs, experimentation initiatives, and advanced training infrastructure, including PMTEC, is essential. The House Armed Services Committee’s role in authorizing and appropriating funds for these activities directly enhances U.S. warfighting readiness and interoperability with allies.
Advanced Warfighting Capabilities: Maintaining Overmatch
While the joint force currently possesses the capability to project effects throughout the AOR, maintaining and expanding this advantage requires continuous integration of new technologies across all domains. Preserving joint warfighting advantages is crucial for deterring conflict and ensuring decisive outcomes should deterrence fail. Advanced capabilities, delivered by maritime, air, expeditionary, land, cyber, space, and special operations components, and enabled by advanced concepts developed in collaboration with allies and partners, are fundamental to maintaining peace and stability across the AOR. To effectively counter competitor anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategies, USINDOPACOM requires joint capabilities that provide overmatch in the near, mid, and long term.
Guam Defense System (GDS): A Homeland Defense Priority
USINDOPACOM’s paramount mission is the defense of the homeland. Establishing the Guam Defense System (GDS), a 360-degree, integrated air and missile defense system on Guam, remains the command’s highest priority. Uninterrupted funding for a single, integrated weapon capability is essential to provide an advanced, integrated, persistent, and layered defense against ballistic, cruise, and hypersonic missiles. The GDS must also be adaptable to incorporate offensive capabilities as needed and synchronize logistics requirements across the island.
The House Armed Services Committee’s support for the Guam Defense System is critical. Congressional authorization and appropriations for GDS development and deployment directly address homeland defense priorities and demonstrate commitment to protecting U.S. territories in the Indo-Pacific.
Decision Superiority: Operating at Speed and Scale
Decision superiority, the ability for the joint force to “see, think, and fight faster” than adversaries, is a crucial operational imperative. Achieving this requires the capacity to operate effectively in contested spaces, maintain persistent, all-domain battlespace awareness, and close kill chains rapidly using advanced munitions enabled by a Joint Fires Network.
To attain decision superiority, the joint force must possess the ability to operate in contested environments and project effects across multiple domains to deny, degrade, or defeat any threat. Adversaries are actively developing and fielding A2/AD capabilities to constrain U.S. military dominance across all domains. Effectively deterring these adversaries and countering A2/AD strategies requires joint warfighting capabilities in the near, mid, and long term, ensuring the U.S. military can operate anywhere it chooses, at the time and place of its choosing.
Persistent, all-domain battlespace awareness is essential, achieved through a suite of all-domain sensors, distributed via a Persistent Targeting-Quality Common Operating Picture (PT-COP) to multiple nodes. An effective PT-COP relies on exquisite intelligence to reach its full potential. In this context, the reauthorization of FISA Section 702, which is set to lapse on December 31, 2023, is of vital importance. Section 702 enables targeted collection of communications from critical foreign intelligence targets outside the United States who utilize U.S. infrastructure and services. A lapse in Section 702 authority would significantly and detrimentally impact foreign intelligence collection relevant to USINDOPACOM’s mission, resulting in a degradation of battlespace awareness.
A final, critical component of decision superiority is an upgraded network of all-domain sensors interconnected with an integrated fires network, armed with advanced weapons capable of engaging all threats within the battlespace. The Joint Fires Network (JFN) delivers decision superiority by fusing land, maritime, air, and space-based sensors with nationally derived intelligence to provide precise target guidance over a resilient and adaptable information technology architecture. JFN enables geographically dispersed commanders to simultaneously share a common understanding of the battlespace, leveraging sensors from any platform to provide targeting guidance to any weapon system. JFN, coupled with the lethality of current and future munitions, underpins conventional deterrence and equips the joint force with the necessary lethality to maintain combat credibility.
The House Armed Services Committee’s oversight of decision superiority initiatives is crucial. Congressional support for sensor development, intelligence capabilities (including FISA Section 702 reauthorization), Joint Fires Network modernization, and advanced munitions acquisition directly impacts the joint force’s ability to achieve decision superiority and maintain a competitive edge.
Mission Partner Environment (MPE): Enhancing Coalition Interoperability
Combined warfighting interoperability necessitates rapid and widespread information sharing with like-minded nations to operate effectively with the joint force. The Mission Partner Environment (MPE) modernizes 13 separate coalition command, control, communication, computer, and information technology (C4IT) network systems into a unified, cyber-secure system. This consolidation delivers enhanced combined command and control (C2) capability throughout the theater. USINDOPACOM’s MPE provides a resilient, secure, interoperable digital architecture supporting all-domain operations, delivering real-time intelligence, and enabling all participants to share a common operational picture.
Congressional support for the Mission Partner Environment is essential for fostering coalition interoperability. The House Armed Services Committee’s oversight of MPE development and implementation ensures that the U.S. military and its partners can effectively operate together, enhancing collective security in the Indo-Pacific.
Integration of Space and Cyber Domains: Maintaining Domain Dominance
Competitors are actively challenging U.S. dominance across all domains, including space and cyber. To maintain warfighting advantages, USINDOPACOM requires resilient and flexible space and cyber capabilities. The command is continuously integrating these capabilities into activities and exercises conducted with allies and partners.
The House Armed Services Committee’s oversight of space and cyber domain integration is critical. Congressional support for investments in space and cyber capabilities, as well as their integration into joint operations and exercises, ensures that the U.S. military can maintain domain dominance and effectively counter emerging threats in these critical areas.
Enhanced Network of Allies and Partners: An Asymmetric Advantage
The U.S. network of allies and partners represents a significant asymmetric advantage, built upon shared values, mutual trust, and respect. Alliances, multilateral arrangements, partnerships, friendships, and Five Eyes relationships are all essential components of this network, playing a vital role in regional security. USINDOPACOM continuously strengthens these layers through increased security cooperation, advanced training, and more complex, multilateral campaigning. These activities enhance interoperability, build partner capacity, and reinforce shared security while upholding the rules-based international order. Deliberate efforts are underway to build theater-wide capabilities through information sharing, further solidifying alliances and partnerships.
The House Armed Services Committee recognizes the paramount importance of alliances and partnerships in the Indo-Pacific. Congressional support for security cooperation programs, foreign military financing, and initiatives that strengthen alliances and partnerships is crucial for maintaining U.S. influence and promoting regional stability.
Five Treaty Alliances: Cornerstones of Regional Security
Australia: A Vital Ally and Regional Leader
The U.S.-Australia alliance has never been stronger or more critical to regional security. Australia is a vital ally and a significant leader in international efforts to promote a free and open Indo-Pacific. Mirroring the U.S., Australia emphasizes transparency and adherence to rules-based behavior and international law in its interactions within the region. Australia contributes to regional and global security through UN sanctions enforcement against the DPRK and by hosting U.S. forces.
Australia is actively expanding its regional collaboration, building stronger relationships with India, Japan, and Indonesia. Australia’s recently signed Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation with Japan, and its leadership in supporting the security and stability of Blue Pacific nations, exemplify its collaborative priorities.
The U.S. and Australia enjoy a robust bilateral relationship, actively seeking to deepen partnership through military engagements, defense acquisitions, and force posture initiatives. Cooperation is expanding across all domains, integrating ranges, improving posture, and expanding multilateral exercises across the theater. Increased cooperation throughout the Indo-Pacific has significantly improved interoperability. Australia hosts the Marine Rotational Force-Darwin (MRF-D), and recently commenced the eleventh rotation through Northern Australia, demonstrating combined operational capability, including participation in Bomber Task Force missions.
The House Armed Services Committee’s support for the U.S.-Australia alliance is unwavering. Congressional backing for joint exercises, security cooperation initiatives, and force posture enhancements with Australia directly strengthens a cornerstone alliance and enhances regional security.
Japan: The Cornerstone of Peace and Prosperity
The U.S.–Japan alliance remains the cornerstone of peace and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region. Japan’s decision to significantly increase its defense budget will enhance the alliance’s capacity to deter conflict and sets a positive example for other like-minded nations committed to defending the rules-based international order. Both nations share aligned perspectives on regional security challenges and are united in efforts to deter conflict. To preserve strategic alignment, efforts are ongoing to complete the realignment of U.S. forces outlined in the DPRI.
At the January 2023 U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee meeting, both nations bilaterally announced the revision of the 2012 Roadmap for Realignment Implementation. This revision will transition the 12th Marine Regiment to the 12th Marine Littoral Regiment in Okinawa by 2025, optimizing alliance force posture.
The JSDF is highly capable and employs a substantial percentage of U.S. defense equipment, ensuring complete interoperability with U.S. forces. Japan has also formally announced its decision to acquire defensive counterstrike capabilities and is actively evaluating delivery platforms and munition options.
Japan is a key security contributor in bilateral and multilateral efforts with partners across the region, supporting a free and open Indo-Pacific. In 2022, Japan signed a Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation with Australia and a Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA) with the U.K. to facilitate military-to-military activities.
The House Armed Services Committee’s commitment to the U.S.-Japan alliance is fundamental to regional stability. Congressional support for force realignment initiatives, defense cooperation programs, and Japan’s defense budget increases directly strengthens this cornerstone alliance and enhances deterrence in the Indo-Pacific.
Republic of Korea (ROK): The Linchpin of Stability
The U.S.-ROK alliance has been the linchpin for maintaining a stable security environment since 1953, and remains steadfastly committed to deterring and responding to the DPRK regime’s threats. A multinational, whole-of-government approach is essential to effectively deter DPRK provocation and enforce UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) sanctions.
The military-to-military relationship between the U.S. and ROK remains robust, with the alliance focused on maintaining military readiness and a combined defense posture tailored to address dynamic challenges on the Korean Peninsula. The resumption of the Extended Deterrence Strategy and Consultation Group (EDSCG), the return of major exercises to the Korean Peninsula, the first U.S. deployment of 5th generation fighter aircraft to the Korean Peninsula, and the first U.S. aircraft carrier port visit to Korea in four years all demonstrate unwavering U.S. commitment. USINDOPACOM is resolute in executing routine deployments of strategic assets to underscore the U.S.’s extended deterrence commitment to the ROK.
The ROK’s 2022 Ministry of National Defense budget, at nearly $46.3 billion USD, is the largest in the ROK’s history, reflecting plans to restructure and modernize the ROK military and acquire capabilities necessary for wartime operational control (OPCON) transition. Progress continues to be made in meeting bilaterally agreed-upon conditions for OPCON transition, which, once achieved, will represent a historic restructuring of the alliance and combined defenses.
The House Armed Services Committee’s support for the U.S.-ROK alliance is critical for maintaining stability on the Korean Peninsula. Congressional backing for joint exercises, extended deterrence deployments, and ROK military modernization efforts, including OPCON transition, directly strengthens this vital alliance and enhances regional security.
Republic of the Philippines: A Strategic Treaty Ally
The Philippines is a strategic treaty ally, and the strong bilateral defense relationship is crucial to the U.S. network of allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific. The United States is committed to continuing persistent counter-terrorism efforts with the Philippines and is increasing support for maritime security, a national security priority for the Philippines.
A U.S. firm, Cerberus, signed an asset purchase agreement in 2022 for the Hanjin Shipyard, now called Agila Subic, and finalized lease agreements for shipyard facilities. One agreement enables the Philippine Navy to utilize the shipyard and host U.S. ships for maintenance and voyage repair in this strategically important location.
Significant progress has been made in improving interoperability between U.S. and Philippines forces through EDCA utilization and expansion. The April 2023 announcement of four new EDCA sites further strengthens the alliance and accelerates the modernization of combined military capabilities.
Balikatan 23, a three-week annual joint command and control exercise (C2X) and field training exercise (FTX) with humanitarian civic assistance events, exemplifies the strong alliance. Featuring AFP and U.S. forces exercising a mutual defense scenario focused on tactical interoperability, Balikatan 23 demonstrates U.S. commitment to the 1951 U.S.-Philippine Mutual Defense Treaty.
The House Armed Services Committee’s support for the U.S.-Philippines alliance is essential for regional security. Congressional backing for EDCA expansion, joint exercises like Balikatan, and maritime security cooperation with the Philippines directly strengthens this strategic alliance and enhances U.S. presence in Southeast Asia.
Kingdom of Thailand: A Critical Regional Partner
The U.S.-Thailand alliance, built upon a mutual interest in maintaining stability in Southeast Asia and the broader region, continues to progress. The U.S. is working to build partner capacity in Thailand and support the modernization of the Royal Thai Army, Navy, Air Force, and Special Operations Forces. USINDOPACOM supports Thailand’s military modernization efforts to enhance Thai capabilities and U.S.-Thai interoperability. Notably, the United States is currently reviewing Thailand’s request to purchase the advanced F-35 fighter aircraft.
Thailand is a critical partner for regional security, providing logistical nodes essential to U.S. military operations throughout the Indo-Pacific region. Efforts are underway to expand access to Utapao Air Base and additional new sites to support airfield dispersal, including Hat Yai and Nam Phong airfields.
Exercise COBRA GOLD (CG) has returned to full-scale participation after COVID-19 related reductions. CG23 enhanced the training and readiness of participating forces through a large multilateral exercise in Thailand. CG is expected to continue expanding in complexity and scale, with over 20 nations participating as observers in 2023. CG is the largest exercise in Southeast Asia, highlighting the multinational security architecture prepared to address future challenges.
The House Armed Services Committee’s support for the U.S.-Thailand alliance is vital for regional stability. Congressional backing for security cooperation programs, military modernization assistance to Thailand, and exercises like Cobra Gold directly strengthens this critical partnership and enhances U.S. access and influence in Southeast Asia.
Multilateral Cooperation: Expanding Collective Security
AUKUS: A Trilateral Security Partnership
The 2021 establishment of AUKUS (Australia, UK, and U.S.) aims to build upon long-standing bilateral ties through a trilateral security partnership focused on defense capabilities that support mutual national defense objectives. The first initiative under AUKUS Pillar I is the Optimal Pathway to deliver a conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarine capability to the Royal Australian Navy, with findings formally announced on March 13, 2023. AUKUS Pillar II efforts focus on developing trilateral capabilities in areas of shared interest including undersea warfare, cyber, artificial intelligence, and quantum computing. These efforts are designed to provide pivotal, future high-end warfighting advantages and enhance combined force posture.
The House Armed Services Committee’s oversight of the AUKUS partnership is crucial. Congressional support for AUKUS initiatives, particularly in advanced technology development and submarine cooperation, strengthens trilateral defense capabilities and enhances long-term security in the Indo-Pacific.
U.S.-Japan-ROK Trilateral Cooperation: Addressing DPRK Provocations
The United States has strengthened trilateral exercises and operations with Japan and the ROK to enhance interoperability, advance intelligence sharing, and improve communication as they collectively deter and respond to increasing DPRK provocations. Ballistic missile defense exercises have included detecting, tracking, and intercepting simulated targets. The U.S., Japan, and the ROK also participated in an integrated air and missile defense exercise with Canada and Australia off the coast of Hawaii, including a live-fire intercept of a short-range ballistic missile. Anti-submarine warfare exercises have also been increased to improve interoperability against undersea threats.
The United States remains committed to the complete and verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and USINDOPACOM will continue to prioritize strong trilateral cooperation to achieve this objective.
The House Armed Services Committee’s support for U.S.-Japan-ROK trilateral cooperation is essential for addressing DPRK threats and promoting regional stability. Congressional backing for trilateral exercises, intelligence sharing initiatives, and diplomatic efforts focused on denuclearization directly strengthens collective security in Northeast Asia.
The Quad: A Diplomatic Partnership for Regional Stability
The Quad, comprising Japan, Australia, India, and the United States, is an important diplomatic partnership in the Indo-Pacific region. While not a military alliance, the Quad nations cooperate on advanced technologies, infrastructure development, and cybersecurity, demonstrating how mature democracies can positively shape the regional security environment. All four nations participate in exercise MALABAR to advance collective planning, integration, and employment of advanced warfare tactics.
The House Armed Services Committee recognizes the value of the Quad as a diplomatic partnership. Congressional support for Quad initiatives, particularly in technology cooperation, infrastructure development, and cybersecurity, contributes to a stable and prosperous Indo-Pacific region.
Strategic Partnerships: Expanding Security Cooperation
India: A Major Defense Partner
The United States and India continue to strengthen their strategic and unique Major Defense Partner relationship, based on a shared vision for maintaining a free and open Indo-Pacific and upholding the rules-based international order. Defense cooperation is increasingly robust, encompassing exercises, information sharing, and efforts to establish greater co-development and co-production of military technology. Regarding the Line of Actual Control, the U.S. supports direct dialogue and peaceful resolution of border disputes amidst provocative Chinese behavior.
USINDOPACOM is cooperating with the Indian Navy to enhance maritime domain awareness, particularly in the underwater domain, to address growing threats in the Indian Ocean. Support is also being provided to the Indian Navy’s Information Fusion Center- Indian Ocean Region (IFC-IOR) through a Liaison officer to enhance information sharing. Air domain cooperation is developing, with B-1B Bombers participating in AERO India 2023 and planned participation in exercise COPE India. The bomber presence signals the growth of the bilateral relationship.
Exercises like TIGER TRIUMPH, COPE India, YUDH ABHYAS, and MALABAR facilitate progress towards interoperability and enhance information sharing as training complexity and scope increase.
USINDOPACOM seeks to deepen cooperation under the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) to enable more regular and flexible reciprocal access in the Indian Ocean Region, including U.S. ship repair in Indian yards. In August 2022, the USNS Charles Drew became the first U.S. Navy ship to undergo mid-voyage repair in an Indian shipyard.
India is currently considering purchasing F-21 (formerly F-16), F/A-18 Super Hornet, F-15EX Eagle, MQ-9B Guardian, and P-8I aircraft. To support India’s defense industrial base growth, the Department of Defense has offered to explore co-production and co-development projects, which would support India’s defense modernization and enhance its capacity as a net security provider in the Indo-Pacific.
The House Armed Services Committee’s support for the U.S.-India Major Defense Partnership is crucial for regional security. Congressional backing for defense technology cooperation, joint exercises, and initiatives that enhance India’s defense capabilities directly strengthens a key strategic partnership and promotes stability in the Indo-Pacific.
Singapore: A Highly Capable Partner in Southeast Asia
Singapore is a highly capable partner, providing critical support for U.S. air and naval forces in the vicinity of the Strait of Malacca and South China Sea, anchoring U.S. presence in Southeast Asia. Demonstrating flexibility, Singapore supported a short-notice U.S. aircraft carrier port visit in July 2022, facilitating essential ship maintenance and crew rest. The Singapore Armed Forces utilize four continental U.S. locations for training, and a non-binding MOU signed in 2019 allows Singapore to establish a permanent fighter detachment on Guam.
Singapore also supports regional and global security initiatives, hosting a multinational maritime Information Fusion Center and a regional Counterterrorism Information Facility (CTIF). The CTIF is USINDOPACOM’s first collaborative, operational partnership with regional states to use network analysis and multilayer analytics to identify terrorist threats.
USINDOPACOM is exploring collaboration opportunities with Singapore’s fourth uniformed service, the Digital and Intelligence Service, inaugurated in October 2022.
The House Armed Services Committee’s support for the U.S.-Singapore partnership is vital for maintaining U.S. presence in Southeast Asia. Congressional backing for security cooperation initiatives, access agreements, and counter-terrorism collaboration with Singapore strengthens a key partnership and enhances regional security.
Developing Regional Partnerships: Expanding Engagement
Northeast Asia: Mongolia and Taiwan
Mongolia: A “Third Neighbor Policy” Partner
Mongolia engages with the United States and other like-minded nations as part of its “Third Neighbor Policy,” balancing Russian and PRC influence by developing relationships with democratic nations. Mongolia is a dedicated partner in global Peacekeeping Operations (PKO). Extensive UN PKO contributions and deployments have provided the Mongolian Armed Forces (MAF) with significant operational experience and enhanced interoperability with the United States.
The active defense relationship with Mongolia is a key component of the Strategic Partnership and contributes to shaping the regional security environment. USINDOPACOM continues to assist the MAF with defense reform, enhancing UN PKO capabilities, improving HA/DR response, developing professional military education programs, and expanding Special Operations Forces capabilities. USINDOPACOM co-sponsors Mongolia’s KHAAN QUEST, an annual multinational exercise promoting regional peace and security.
Taiwan: Supporting Self-Defense Capabilities
U.S. policy on Taiwan remains consistent. The U.S. continues to uphold its support for Taiwan’s self-defense capabilities, consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act. Support for Taiwan is strong, principled, and aligned with the one China policy, guided by commitments in the Taiwan Relations Act, the three U.S.-PRC Joint Communiques, and the Six Assurances. The U.S. supports a peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues, consistent with the interests and best wishes of the people on Taiwan. Defense engagement with Taiwan helps ensure Taiwan remains secure, confident, free from coercion, and able to engage in peaceful and productive dialogue.
The House Armed Services Committee plays a critical role in overseeing U.S. policy towards Mongolia and Taiwan. Congressional support for security cooperation with Mongolia and for Taiwan’s self-defense capabilities is essential for maintaining regional stability and promoting democratic values in Northeast Asia.
Southeast Asia: ASEAN and Emerging Partnerships
U.S. engagement with Southeast Asia and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) strengthens relationships and demonstrates U.S. commitment to the region and multilateral partnerships. ASEAN, currently comprising ten member states, agreed in principle in November 2022 to admit Timor-Leste as its 11th member.
ASEAN is the most influential multilateral institution in the Indo-Pacific. The U.S. supports the principle of ASEAN centrality, recognizing its importance in building trust, preventing conflict, and reinforcing the rules-based international order.
Concerns persist regarding PRC pressure on ASEAN members to conclude South China Sea Code of Conduct negotiations in a manner that would impede lawful activities and undermine ASEAN members’ ability to engage in governmental or economic activities with foreign partners. At the 2022 U.S.-ASEAN Summit, President Biden announced the launch of the U.S.-ASEAN Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. USINDOPACOM is integral to ASEAN’s multilateral capacity building efforts and will continue to invest resources in enhancing this partnership.
Brunei: Expanding Military Cooperation
The U.S.-Brunei defense relationship is robust and expanding, with increasing military cooperation. Brunei seeks enhanced cooperation with USINDOPACOM, and 2022 saw the establishment of the first U.S.-Brunei Land Forces Talks.
In September 2022, Brunei approved the first multilateral training event on Brunei soil. The U.K. Special Boat Service joined U.S. Navy SEALs and the Brunei Special Forces Regiment during Exercise NEPTUNE WARRIOR.
USINDOPACOM is collaborating with Brunei and deepening cooperation in mutually beneficial areas, including maritime domain awareness. Brunei’s Integrator UAS, a Direct Commercial Sales purchase, is now operational, bolstering maritime domain awareness and border security. Brunei has received six Integrator UAS platforms and will receive a final three in early 2023. UAS were incorporated into bilateral exercises for the first time in 2022 via PALAWAN WARRIOR and the Southeast Asia Cooperation and Training (SEACAT) Exercise.
Burma (Myanmar): Condemning Military Coup
The Department of Defense condemns the Burmese military’s 2021 coup, deposing the democratically elected government and detaining government officials, journalists, human rights activists, and civil society members. The military employs brutal and excessive violence while restricting basic freedoms. USINDOPACOM does not engage with the Burmese military.
Russia has capitalized on the coup to increase engagement with the Burmese military through high-level visits, military-to-military exchanges, and sustained weapons and equipment sales.
The coup has stalled ASEAN efforts to resolve political and humanitarian crises, leading ASEAN to downgrade Burma’s attendance at high-level events.
Cambodia: Concerns over PRC Military Presence
In early 2017, Cambodia suspended all military-to-military exercises with the United States. USINDOPACOM continues to cooperate with Cambodia on humanitarian mine clearance and Missing-in-Action (MIA) personnel accounting.
USINDOPACOM has serious concerns about the PRC’s military presence and facility construction at Ream Naval Base in the Gulf of Thailand. While USINDOPACOM desires military-to-military engagement with Cambodia when policy allows, Cambodia’s actions to limit democracy and lack of transparency regarding Ream Naval Base weaken the foundation for rebuilding trust.
Indonesia: A Key Regional Maritime Leader
Indonesia occupies a strategically key position as a regional leader and the third-largest democracy globally. Defense ties with Indonesia are strong. Indonesia is advancing its status as a regional maritime leader, increasing enforcement against illegal fishing and investing in defense articles to modernize and replace equipment.
The exercise program continues to grow, exemplified by GARUDA SHIELD 2023, the largest multilateral event to date designed for joint and combined training. Future iterations will support Indonesia’s newly developed Joint Transformation Initiative and are likely to include more like-minded allies and partners. The Joint Exercise Program has been expanded to include GARUDA SHIELD, and partner capacity building with the Indonesian military will continue.
Laos: Reconciling Legacy of War Issues
Laos is one of the least developed countries in the region, with the PRC holding approximately 50 percent of its external debt. Laos seeks balance between traditional relationships with Vietnam, PRC, and Russia, and is pursuing stronger ties with other ASEAN members and regional partners.
Reconciling legacy of war issues remains a focal point in the U.S.-Laos relationship, aiming to resolve Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) and Prisoner of War/Missing in Action (POW/MIA) recovery issues by 2030. Laos repatriated two sets of remains in 2022.
Malaysia: Enhancing Maritime Domain Awareness
The U.S.-Malaysia military-to-military relationship has steadily grown over the past decade. Malaysia has shifted its military focus towards external security, developing a viable coast guard, and improving maritime domain awareness through intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities. The U.S. supports Malaysia’s maritime domain awareness by providing dual-purpose capabilities for Counter-Terrorism (CT) and Maritime Security (MARSEC) contexts. Since 2017, the U.S. has invested approximately $220 million in Maritime Security Initiative/Building Partner Capacity (MSI/BPC) programs supporting MARSEC objectives. During CARAT 2022, Malaysia hosted 7th Fleet Sailors and Marines, and the Malaysian Armed Forces operated newly acquired Link-16 ground stations with U.S. forces.
Timor-Leste: An Emerging Strategic Partner
Timor-Leste is geographically strategic within the Second Island Chain and an emerging partner welcoming expanded U.S. security cooperation. The 5-year, $23 million Baucau airfield joint rehabilitation effort will expand airfield access to support military exercises. The MARSEC program also opens doors for expanded access and presence.
Timor-Leste was granted ASEAN special observer status in November 2022, and ASEAN has agreed in principle to admit Timor-Leste as the 11th member of ASEAN.
Vietnam: Supporting Rules-Based Order in the South China Sea
Vietnam is a vocal supporter of adherence to international laws, freedom of navigation, and the rules-based international order in the South China Sea. The U.S. and Vietnam signed a Three-Year Defense Cooperation Plan of Action for 2022-2024 and an updated Defense Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) Annex codifying new cooperation areas including defense trade, pilot training, cyber, and personnel accounting (POW/MIA).
The House Armed Services Committee’s oversight of engagement with Southeast Asian nations is critical for regional stability and promoting U.S. interests. Congressional support for security cooperation programs, exercises, and partnerships with ASEAN members, Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Timor-Leste, and Vietnam, while addressing concerns regarding Burma and Cambodia, is essential for maintaining U.S. influence and promoting a free and open Indo-Pacific.
South Asia: Bangladesh, Maldives, Nepal, and Sri Lanka
Bangladesh: An Important Security Partner
Bangladesh is an important security partner for enhancing regional stability. Efforts are underway to conclude a General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) to facilitate defense cooperation. GSOMIA conclusion will enhance Bangladesh’s access to high-end U.S. military equipment, and other avenues for strengthening security cooperation are being explored. This presents opportunities for increased bilateral engagement in information sharing, military hardware, maritime security training, doctrine development, communications training, and joint planning and operations. Bangladesh prioritizes maritime domain awareness capability development and is seeking to modernize and diversify its military equipment.
Maldives: An Integral Part of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific
Maldives is a valuable partner and an integral part of a free and open Indo-Pacific. In 2022, the Maldives National Defense Force (MNDF) sought increased engagement with the U.S. military and like-minded partners. Maldives co-hosted the 2022 USINDOPACOM Intel-Chiefs Conference, the USINDOPACOM Environmental Security Forum, and the Special Operations Command Tempest Wind exercise. Counter-terrorism remains an enduring area of mutual cooperation. In 2022, the MNDF affirmed participation in a trilateral CT exercise with the U.S. and U.K. Maldives also signed an arrangement with the Montana National Guard to join the State Partnership Program. The addition of a Deputy Security Cooperation Chief at U.S. Embassy Colombo dedicated to U.S. Mission Maldives will further enhance this partnership.
Nepal: A Leader in UN Peacekeeping Operations
The U.S. has a strong partnership with the Nepali Army, conducting security cooperation activities focused on HA/DR, PKO, military professionalization, and border security. Nepal is a regional and global leader in UN PKO. USINDOPACOM supports Nepal’s PKO cadre development through Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) funds provided by the Department of State.
Sri Lanka: Building Partner Capacity
USINDOPACOM seeks to ensure Sri Lanka is a capable regional partner with a professional military force supporting the rules-based international order. The Department of Defense continues to seek opportunities to expand exercises with Sri Lanka and encourages collaboration with like-minded nations to build partner capacity. Sri Lanka will host the FY23 USINDOPACOM Environmental Security Forum to identify cooperation areas and security impacts of climate change. Sri Lanka’s recent announcement to reduce and restructure its Armed Forces suggests opportunities for future security cooperation activities focused on defense professionalization and capacity building in maritime security, HA/DR, and UN PKO.
The House Armed Services Committee’s oversight of engagement with South Asian nations is vital for regional stability and promoting U.S. interests. Congressional support for security cooperation programs, exercises, and partnerships with Bangladesh, Maldives, Nepal, and Sri Lanka is essential for expanding U.S. influence and enhancing regional security.
Blue Pacific: Cooperation in Oceania
In 2022, Australia, Japan, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States established the Partners in the Blue Pacific, an inclusive, informal coordination initiative effectively supporting the Pacific region. Efforts are guided by the 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent, the Pacific Islands Forum’s long-term strategy for a free, safe, and prosperous region.
Blue Pacific cooperation is critical to a free and open Indo-Pacific, enabling coordination with allies and partners across strategic sea lines of communication. Blue Pacific nations emphasize the security impacts of climate change as the greatest threat to livelihoods, security, and well-being. Other security priorities include countering illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing, transnational crime, cybersecurity, maritime domain awareness, and drug trafficking.
The Freely Associated States (FAS): Cornerstones of U.S. Security Architecture
The Freely Associated States of RMI, FSM, and Palau are cornerstones of the U.S. security architecture in Oceania, linking the U.S. with the Blue Pacific and Southeast Asia. RMI, FSM, and Palau have the highest military service per capita in the U.S. military and make significant contributions to U.S. operations. Compacts of Free Association (COFAs) agreements with the FAS provide U.S. economic assistance and defense posture opportunities in the Indo-Pacific. Under COFAs, the U.S. has full authority and responsibility for security and defense matters related to these three countries, including extensive access to operate in these territories and the ability to deny access to third-country militaries. MOUs supporting the COFAs were signed with RMI, FSM, and Palau in early 2023. USINDOPACOM engages in military construction projects throughout the FAS to improve air and maritime infrastructure, enhance domain awareness, and support FAS efforts to protect economic interests.
Fiji: A Regional Economic and Defense Leader
As a regional economic and defense leader, Fiji is integral to Southwest Pacific security. Cooperation with Fijian forces occurs through exercises, security cooperation, and activities with the Nevada National Guard State Partnership Program (SPP). Fiji’s new training center, Blackrock, supports UN PKO deployments globally. The Republic of Fiji Military Forces (RFMF) deployed security forces to the Solomon Islands after 2022 riots and to the Sinai as part of the Multinational Force, as well as to other UN missions. The RFMF hosts USARPAC’s multilateral exercise CARTWHEEL and will co-host the 2023 Chiefs of Defense Conference in Fiji.
New Zealand: A Steadfast Blue Pacific Partner
New Zealand remains a steadfast partner and important leader in the Blue Pacific. The U.S.-New Zealand bilateral defense relationship is strong and growing. In 2022, the RNZN HMNZS AOTEAROA participated in RIMPAC, conducted regional maritime patrols and Pacific Island engagements, and provided logistical support to U.S., U.K., Australian, and JMSDF vessels. New Zealand also supports DPRK UNSCR enforcement efforts by providing maritime patrol aircraft and personnel for the Enforcement Coordination Cell.
Papua New Guinea (PNG): An Important Emerging Partner
PNG is an important emerging partner with a shared history dating back to World War II. USINDOPACOM is in discussions with PNG leadership regarding significant posture initiatives contingent on signing a bilateral Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA). Negotiations with PNG on a DCA and a ship rider agreement are ongoing.
Security cooperation initiatives in PNG, though limited, are important for growing PNG Defense Force (PNGDF) capability, strengthening security ties, and assisting in military development. USINDOPACOM supports State Department implementation of the Global Fragility Act strategy by providing disaster response and gender equity training to PNGDF. The burgeoning relationship between the Wisconsin National Guard and PNGDF is also supported.
Tonga: A Partner with Coalition Participation History
Tonga is a partner with a history of coalition participation and ties to the Nevada National Guard through the SPP. Defense engagement has returned to pre-COVID levels to build partner capacity. A regional leader, Tonga hosted the 2022 Southwest Pacific Defense Minister’s Meeting in November, with senior defense delegations from Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Australia, New Zealand, Chile, and France, including observers from the U.S. and Japan.
The House Armed Services Committee’s oversight of engagement with Blue Pacific nations is crucial for regional stability and promoting U.S. interests in Oceania. Congressional support for the Partners in the Blue Pacific initiative, Compacts of Free Association, and security cooperation programs with Fiji, New Zealand, PNG, and Tonga is essential for maintaining U.S. influence and addressing shared security challenges in the Pacific Islands.
Other Indo-Pacific Nations: Canada, France, and United Kingdom
Canada: A Key Indo-Pacific Ally
Canada is a key Indo-Pacific ally and a staunch supporter of the rules-based international order, deploying highly capable forces to the Pacific to support UNSCR enforcement efforts. Canada conducted combined Taiwan Strait Transits with the U.S. to support sovereignty and freedom of navigation. Canada recently released a new Indo-Pacific Strategy aligned with like-minded nations to ensure a free and open Indo-Pacific.
France: A Pivotal Contributor to Regional Security
The U.S. maintains defense cooperation activities in the Indo-Pacific with France, America’s oldest ally. France has the largest EEZ in the region, with commands in French Polynesia (FAPF), New Caledonia (FANC), and South Indian Ocean Zone (FAZOI). France contributes to regional security by protecting fisheries, building community resilience, countering transnational crime including trans-Pacific narcotics trafficking, and supporting HADR efforts. Increased key leader engagements and multiple deployments to the theater are enhancing interoperability with the U.S. and other key allies. The French-led multilateral exercise MARARA and the LA PEROUSE exercise in the Indian Ocean Region demonstrate commitment to regional cooperation. France also supports UNSCR sanction enforcement against North Korea and updated its Indo-Pacific Strategy in 2022 to focus on increased cooperation with like-minded regional partners.
United Kingdom (U.K.): A Champion of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific
The U.K. remains committed to the region as a champion of a free and open Indo-Pacific, maintaining a sustained defense posture, including renewing the Brunei Garrison Agreement. In 2022, the U.K. continued deploying Royal Navy offshore patrol vessels to the region for exercises supporting the Five Power Defence Arrangement (FPDA) and various bilateral and multilateral Operations, Activities, and Investments (OAIs). The U.K. also signed a Reciprocal Access Agreement with Japan in 2022. USINDOPACOM benefits from basing and access to the British Indian Ocean Territory at Diego Garcia.
The House Armed Services Committee’s oversight of engagement with Canada, France, and the United Kingdom underscores the importance of broader international cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. Congressional support for defense cooperation programs, joint exercises, and diplomatic initiatives with these key allies enhances collective security and promotes a free and open Indo-Pacific.
Other Areas of Cooperation: WPS Program, JTF-Red Hill, and Climate Change
Women, Peace and Security (WPS) Program: A National Security Imperative
The Women, Peace and Security (WPS) program is codified in law as a national security imperative, and USINDOPACOM is focused on WPS implementation. The command’s WPS program is a unique competitive advantage that promotes a free and open Indo-Pacific by upholding international human rights and the rules-based international order.
In 2022, WPS work expanded to meet growing demand for WPS training, engagements, and integration into existing activities. USINDOPACOM conducted WPS seminars with the Mongolian Armed Forces as part of KHAAN QUEST to support an upcoming PKO deployment and supported several ASEAN events focused on a human security approach. Increased focus is placed on WPS work with Blue Pacific partners, including developing a WPS National Action Plan in Fiji and planned assistance to the Solomon Islands.
A regional Gender Advisor training in coordination with Australia, New Zealand, and Japan is planned for August 2023, and tailored WPS initiatives will continue with Pacific Islands countries, Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, and others.
Joint Task Force-Red Hill: Defueling and Environmental Protection
In the past year, Secretary Austin tasked USINDOPACOM to establish Joint Task Force Red Hill to safely and efficiently defuel the Red Hill Bulk Fuel Storage Facility on Oahu. Through cooperation, openness, and transparency with the EPA and the Hawaii Department of Health, steady progress has been made. Actions are guided by commitments to the health and safety of the people of Hawaii, protecting the natural environment, and accomplishing assigned missions.
Security Impacts of Climate Change and Disaster Preparedness
The security impacts of climate change pose a significant challenge to allies and partners in the USINDOPACOM AOR. Pacific nations frequently cite climate change as their top concern. Oceania, South, and Southeast Asia are particularly vulnerable to food security, water security, and agricultural productivity challenges exacerbated by extreme weather impacts.
Addressing these issues strengthens relationships as shared concerns are recognized. The military’s role in disaster preparedness and response builds trust and resilience regionally. The annual Pacific Partnership mission delivers medical, engineering, and HA/DR projects to address these challenges. Pacific Partnership 2022 saw the USNS MERCY team treat over 15,000 patients and complete 10 major construction projects in Vietnam, Palau, the Philippines, and Solomon Islands.
Understanding security impacts from sea level rise, temperature changes, and extreme storms is essential for long-term planning for U.S. operating locations in the Indo-Pacific region. USINDOPACOM is committed to reinforcing infrastructure, increasing facility resilience, and assisting allies and partners in doing the same.
The House Armed Services Committee’s oversight extends to these crucial areas of cooperation. Congressional support for the WPS program, JTF-Red Hill’s defueling efforts, and initiatives addressing the security impacts of climate change demonstrates a comprehensive approach to regional security and well-being.
Conclusion: Urgency and Congressional Support for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific
The global security environment has undergone dramatic shifts in the past year. The PRC has accelerated its whole-of-government challenge to the rules-based international order, partnering with Russia to advance shared goals. Strategic competition with the United States now encompasses all forms of national power across all domains. Efforts to divide the U.S. from like-minded nations are increasing, aiming to establish regional dominance.
Implementing the National Defense Strategy (NDS) in the near, mid, and long term requires the United States to maintain a persistent, lethal, and integrated joint force west of the IDL. This force must be capable of denying adversary objectives while simultaneously demonstrating unwavering U.S. commitment and resolve to allies and partners. Seize the Initiative serves as USINDOPACOM’s approach, in support of the NDS, to deliver combat-credible integrated deterrence. This is achieved through a distributed force posture, enhanced joint and combined operational campaigns, advanced warfighting capabilities, and a strengthened network of allies and partners. Success demands urgent action and sustained congressional support.
Timely appropriations are of paramount importance. The Department of Defense’s capacity to accelerate progress in the current year and effectively plan and execute programming in the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) is contingent upon receiving adequate resources to initiate new programs and sustain essential ongoing programs. Continuing resolutions (CRs) result in cumulative and detrimental effects on buying power, exacerbated by inflation, and increase operational risk.
While conflict in the INDOPACOM AOR is neither imminent nor inevitable, there is no time for complacency. Decisive action is required now to maintain a free and open Indo-Pacific. The House Armed Services Committee’s continued engagement and support are essential to ensuring USINDOPACOM has the resources and authorities necessary to meet these challenges and secure U.S. interests in this vital region.
